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AbstrACt
Objectives Social services are increasingly commissioned 
to third and for-profit sector providers, but little is known 
about whether and how these changes influence quality 
indicators. We assessed quality-related outcomes across 
for-profit, public and third sector organisations delivering 
social care services.
Design A secondary analysis was conducted on publically 
available data collected by the independent regulator 
of social care organisations in Scotland. All outcomes 
are reported as predicted probabilities derived from 
multivariate logistic regression coefficients. Generalised 
ordered logit models are utilised for the quality domains 
and the risk assessment score and logistic regression 
for whether complaints or requirements were issued to 
organisations.
setting Organisations inspected by the Care Inspectorate 
in Scotland.
Population 13 310 social care organisations (eg, nursing 
homes and day care organisations).
Primary outcomes The quality and risk domains collected 
by the Care Inspectorate and complaints and requirements 
issued to organisations within the last 3 years.
results Controlling for multiple factors, we find that public 
and third sector providers performed consistently and 
statistically significantly better than for-profit organisations 
on most outcomes. For example, for-profit services were 
the most likely to be rated as high and medium risk (6.9% 
and 13.2%, respectively), and the least likely to be classified 
as low risk (79.9%). Public providers had the highest 
probability of being categorised as low risk (91.1%), and 
the lowest probability of having their services classified 
as medium (6.9%) and high risk (2%), followed by third 
sector providers (86%, 8.5% and 4.5%, respectively). Public 
providers performed better than third sector providers in 
some outcomes, but differences were relatively low and 
inconsistent.
Conclusion Public and third sector providers were rated 
considerably higher than their for-profit counterparts 
on most observed outcomes. Regulators might use this 
information to consider how social care providers across 
sector are incentivised to manage their resources.
IntrODuCtIOn
Health and social care services are often 
delivered in quasi-markets, and an increasing 
proportion of these services are implemented 
by for-profit organisations (FPOs) and third 
sector organisations (TSOs).1–4 Quasi-mar-
kets are characterised by free bidding from 
organisations across different sectors5 and 
can be defined as ‘…markets where the provi-
sion of a service is undertaken by competi-
tive providers as in pure markets, but where 
the purchasers of the service are financed 
from resources provided by the state instead 
of from their own private resources’.6 Thus, 
quasi-markets primarily include services that 
are free or subsidised to service users (eg, 
healthcare or nursing homes), but where 
providers from all sectors (ie, public, for-profit 
and third) compete for service contracts.
It has been argued that quasi-markets can 
lead to more efficient and equitable service 
deliveries,5 7 but there is little conclusive 
evidence to support that proposition. In 
theory, quasi-markets may produce favour-
able outcomes, in that the bidding system can 
be thought to force organisations to respond 
to the needs of service users and allow the 
best and most innovative providers to attain 
the contract. However, the utility of this type 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The publically available data  set provided by the 
Care Inspectorate allows for testing variation in 
quality-related outcomes across public, for-profit 
and third sector care providers in Scotland.
 ► The analysis aimed to replicate past research in a 
new context controlling for more factors (eg, number 
of staff) and on a broader range of outcomes (eg, 
user-reported complaints).
 ► There were few observations for organisations with 
very low quality levels, making comparison across 
sector difficult in these categories.
 ► The findings were consistent across the quality do-
mains collected by the Care Inspectorate and as to 
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of market strongly relies on the commissioning structures 
in place to allocate funding, which is known to have been 
flawed in the past.8–10 Further, it has long been under-
stood that mechanisms of action considering behaviour 
and the design of social policy requires more than simply 
an analysis of monetary incentives.11
It has long been assumed that providers from different 
sectors are subject to different incentives and organisa-
tional characteristics.12–16 For example, FPOs are often 
perceived to be legitimised by the pursuit of profit maximi-
sation, suggesting that they may engage in opportunistic 
behaviour at the potential expense of the service user 
without regulation. Conversely, TSOs and public sector 
organisations (PSOs) are often considered to be legiti-
mised by their ability to achieve social value, suggesting 
that their incentive to deliver services are predominantly 
motivated by pro-social pursuits, thus, making them more 
‘trustworthy’ providers of public services.17 These theoret-
ical differences across sector are summarised in table 1.
Importantly, there is no general consensus on what 
these theoretical differences between sectors mean in 
practice and whether, and if so, how, they may relate to 
quality of service.
To explore sector differences in the context of health 
services, a relatively recent overview of systematic reviews 
investigated how ownership influences the performance of 
healthcare providers.18 The overview included 15 system-
atic reviews that were conducted in various contexts (eg, 
low-income and middle-income countries and high-in-
come countries) and with different types of providers (eg, 
hospitals and nursing homes). The paper found mixed 
results with non-profit providers performing better than 
for-profit providers on certain indicators (eg, mortality 
and price), but not on others (eg, healthcare-related 
outcomes). Further, the results should be interpreted with 
the caveat that most of the included systematic reviews 
had significant methodological flaws and only one of the 
reviews was considered ‘reliable’. As a result, the over-
view concludes that more high quality primary research 
is needed, especially in exploring variation across PSOs, 
FPOs and TSOs, rather than just between for-profit and 
non-profit providers.18
However, little research has been conducted on sector 
difference in social care settings, even though more social 
services are undertaken by for-profit and third sector 
providers,3 19 20 and that sector variation in service quality 
thus have important implications for practice. To explore 
the merit of existing theories and to inform future policy 
on the contracting of social services, it is central to test 
whether the typology of sector accounts for variation 
across factors that matter to practice, such as quality and 
performance.
Objectives
It remains relatively inconclusive whether typology of 
sector is based on research conventions rather than 
empirical evidence.21 The focus of this paper will be to 
empirically test whether and if so how ‘sector’ accounts 
for variation in quality of social care organisations using 
data from the Care Inspectorate in Scotland. This focus 
can be summarised by the following research question:
Does the quality of social care services vary among 
for-profit, public and third sector organisations as as-
sessed by the quality and risk domains of the Care 
Inspectorate in Scotland?
Data: the Care Inspectorate
The Care Inspectorate serves as the regulator of care 
services in Scotland and currently (January 2018) includes 
data on 13 310 organisations, which is available for down-
load on the official website and updated monthly.22 
Regulated organisations work within a range of different 
services, with the biggest categories being childminding, 
children day care services, support services, care homes 
for the elderly and housing support (see tables A1–A2 
in online supplementary appendix A for description of 
included services).
To fulfil its regulating role, the Care Inspectorate 
regularly inspects care facilities, which entails assessing 
the quality and risk of services. The grading of quality 
Table 1 Theoretical distinction of sectors
For-profit sector Public sector Third sector
Definition Organisations that are privately 
owned and administered 
according to the pursuit of 
profits.
Organisations that are 
publically owned and 
administered.
Organisations that are formally 
structured, privately owned, non-
profit distributing, self-governing 
and benefiting from voluntary 
activities.42
Primary activities Conventionally private goods, 
but increasingly also public 
goods
Public goods Public goods
Main type of income Profits from sales of products 
and/or services
Taxation Charitable contributions and/or 
commissioning
Purpose/motivation Maximise and sustain profits Achieve social mission (public 
sector motivation/social value)
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is done according to the National Care Standards,23 
which considers the following principles: ‘dignity and 
respect’; ‘compassion’; ‘be inclusive’, ‘responsive care 
and support’ and ‘well-being’. The ratings are graded 
from 1 to 6, in which 1 is unsatisfactory and 6 is excellent. 
Further, the Care Inspectorate distributes a risk score to 
care providers assessing whether a service can be said to 
be of ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ risk to service users, which 
subsequently influences how regularly an organisation 
should be inspected and the quality domains to which the 
service should be subjected.24 The four quality domains 
and the risk assessment are described in table 2.
The inspections are done by trained staff following 
a standardised procedure, which includes visiting the 
facility in question unannounced, conducting interviews 
with staff and service users, as well as physically examining 
the facilities.25 26 Inspected organisations must also fill out 
a self-assessment form, which is reviewed in combination 
with the organisation’s history of posed requirements and 
complaints as part of the grading process. Special guide-
lines apply to certain care services, such as organisations 
that work with children and young people.27
MethODs
This paper is reported following best practice guide-
lines.28 29 All analyses were conducted in Stata V.14.
The quality and risk domains collected by the 
Care Inspectorate are ordinal in nature and thus lend 
themselves to ordered logistic regression. However, this 
technique rests on the proportional odds or parallel lines 
assumption, which requires the effect of the odds to be 
constant across all logits.30 Substantively, this would mean 
that the effect of sector on quality would be constant 
across all levels of quality.
We tested this assumption across sector on the quality 
domains and risk assessment using the ‘brant’ command,31 
which demonstrated the parallel lines assumption to be 
violated in three quality domains (except for quality of 
environment) and the risk assessment, thus suggesting 
that the effect of sector does vary across different levels 
of quality and risk. To use the ordering of the data, while 
also allowing for the proportional odds assumption to be 
relaxed, we employ generalised ordered logistic regres-
sion, which is less restrictive than ordered logistic regres-
sion and more suitable for non-linear associations.30 
Specifically, we will use the gologit2 command written 
and regularly updated by Richard Williams.32
Logistic regression is known to entail several limita-
tions, especially when it comes to accurately presenting 
and interpreting ORs.33 To demonstrate the effect of 
sector, we report results as predicted probabilities, which 
are often argued to be a more robust and intuitively inter-
pretable effect size compared with ORs.34 35 Therefore, we 
will not report on the actual coefficients (although these 
can be found in online supplementary appendix B), but 
instead use the gologit2 output to compute non-linear 
probability models.30
While marginal effects and predicted probabilities are 
not immune to unobserved heterogeneity,36 they are 
considered less sensitive to changes in the model specifi-
cation than ORs.34 All predicted probabilities are derived 
following marginal standardisation, that is, as the average 
effect of sector on quality, as opposed to the effect of sector 
on quality on average (ie, prediction at the means).37 We 
use the ‘mtable’ command to derive predicted probabil-
ities, and the ‘mchange’ command to test if the changes 
in probability are statistically significant.38 All differences 
in probabilities are reported in percentage points rather 
than as relative differences.
explanatory variables
The key explanatory variables are sector, which is coded 
as dummies: for-profit (‘private’), public (‘local authori-
ties’) and third sector (‘voluntary or not for profit’), with 
FPOs as the benchmark category. We rely on the classifi-
cation of service type provided by the Care Inspectorate 
and the analysis thus rests on the assumption that similarly 
classified service types do not differ systematically across 
sectors. However, to account for the possibility that the 
effect of sector varies according to different services, all 
service types are included as dummy variables. We exclude 
service types with very limited sector variation (ie, adop-
tion services, adult placement services, childminding, 
fostering services, nurse agencies and offender accom-
modation services). We also ran the models on the largest 
subcategories of services to explore generalisability across 
Table 2 Quality domains employed by the Care 
Inspectorate.
Quality and risk domains Elaboration
Quality of care and support How well does the service meet 
the needs of the service users? 
This includes looking at the 
outcomes and materials of the 
provided services and interviewing 
service users.
Quality of management and 
leadership
How is the service managed 
and does the strategy for 
development consider the 
needs of the service users? This 
includes interviewing staff and 
service users.
Quality of environment What is the quality of the setting in 
which a service is delivered? This 
includes investigating if the site is 
clean and properly maintained.
Quality of staffing What is the quality of staff in terms 
of, for example, qualifications and 
training? This includes interviewing 
staff and service users.
Risk of services A joint assessment of the nature 
of the services (some services are 
inherently more ‘risky’ than others), 
if complaints have been issued 
towards a service and whether any 
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included service types (ie, care home services, children 
day care services, housing support services and support 
services). To ensure that observed effects were not driven 
by experience of service providers, we control for the 
number of years of registration with the CI. Further, we 
include dummy variables for whether an organisation 
has improved, declined or stagnated in its lowest ranked 
category since the last inspection. Finally, we control for 
the client group of care organisations (eg, children, older 
people, dementia patients), whether an organisation is 
currently active, and the number of employed staff.
Dependent variables
The dependent variables of interest are the quality and 
risk domains described in table 2. To test if sector predicts 
variation in regulation, we also investigate if organisations 
from different sectors vary in their probability to having 
been issued a requirement as a result of an inspection. 
Further, to ensure that the effect of sector on quality 
aligns to a user-reported outcome, we explore the proba-
bility of organisations having been subject to at least one 
complaint within the last 3 years.
Due to a limited number of observations in each group, 
we merged category 1 and 2 (‘poor quality’), category 3 
and 4 (‘adequate quality’) and category 5 and 6 (‘high 
quality’) across all quality domains. However, all reported 
analyses were also run on the original quality scores, 
which demonstrate similar results. Number of require-
ments and complaints were treated as binary variables 
(having received a requirement/complaint or not within 
last 3 years).
Patient and public involvement
Patients and public were not involved.
results
Descriptive statistics
The data set includes 8111 (60.94%) FPOs, 2602 (19.55%) 
TSOs and 2597 (19.51%) PSOs. Table 3 shows that FPOs 
have a higher number of employed staff on average, 
compared with PSOs and TSOs, but that the spread of 
observations for staff in FPOs is also the highest. TSOs 
have the highest proportion of organisations (4.66%) 
which improved their minimum quality rating within 
the last month, although the difference between sectors 
is modest. PSOs have, on average, been registered the 
longest, whereas FPOs tend to have been registered for a 
shorter period than PSOs and TSOs.
Table 4 displays the cross tabulations of whether 
organisations have been subject to requirements after 
an inspection and if any complaints have been posed 
towards an organisation within the last 3 years. We see 
that PSOs received the fewest (proportionally) require-
ments (13.28%) and that FPOs and TSOs receive similar 
numbers of requirements (18.31% vs 19.43%). FPOs 
received a higher proportion of complaints compared 
with PSOs and TSOs, although the difference between 
the for-profit and third sector is relatively small (10.84% 
vs 8.65%).
Table 4 further shows that there is a roughly equal 
proportion of TSOs and FPOs with a ‘poor’ quality rating 
and that PSOs tend to have the lowest proportion of 
organisations in this category. However, more FPOs score 
‘adequately’ relative to PSOs and TSOs, and, conversely, 
a higher proportion of PSOs and TSOs fall within the 
high-quality category, compared with FPOs. One excep-
tion is the ‘quality of environment’ domain, in which the 
proportions across different levels of quality is roughly 
similar across sector. PSOs have the highest proportion 
of ‘low-risk’ organisations, whereas TSOs seem to be of 
proportionally higher risk compared with PSOs and FPOs.
Predicted probabilities
Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of all outcome 
variables (the four quality domains, risk, requirements 
and complaints) across sector. The probabilities are 
derived from the generalised ordered logistic regres-
sion models, controlling for years of registration, type of 
Table 3 Descriptive characteristics
For-profit sector Public sector Third sector
Number of organisations 8111 (60.94%) 2597 (19.51%) 2602 (19.55%) 
Active organisations
  Active 7891 (97.29%) 2572 (99.04%) 2566 (98.62%) 
  Inactive 220 (2.71%) 25 (0.96%) 36 (1.38%) 
Change in minimum quality rating in the last month
  Same 6576 (93.44%) 2363 (93.14%) 2246 (91.08%)
  Decline 215 (3.05%) 96 (3.78%) 105 (4.26%)
  Improve 247 (3.51%) 78 (3.07%) 115 (4.66%)
  Average number of staff 14.56 (31.87) 10.62 (27.27) 12.76 (24.68) 
  Average years of registration 8.58 (5.42) 13.92 (3.77) 11.53 (4.90) 
Percentages in parenthesis for number of organisations, active organisations and changes in minimum quality ratings. SD in parenthesis for 
the average number of staff and years of registration. 
 o
n
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sector, whether an organisation is active, target group of 
service providers (eg, residents with dementia), type of 
service provider, number of employed staff and whether 
an organisation has improved, declined or stagnated in 
its lowest ranked quality category since the last inspec-
tion. The number of included observations in the gener-
alised logistic models are lower than in table 5 due to the 
exclusion of service types with limited sector variation 
(ie, childminding, adoption services, adult placement 
services, nurse agencies and offender accommodation 
services). However, the observed effect of sector on 
quality remains similar when running more simple 
and inclusive models. For the binary outcome variables 
(complaints and requirements), the predicted probabili-
ties are derived from multiple logistic regression models, 
controlling for the same variables as described above. To 
adjust for multiplicity, all displayed CIs are Bonferroni 
corrected.
Differences between FPOs, PsOs and tsOs
Figure 1 shows a similar pattern to the cross tabulations of 
quality across sector (see tables A3–A4 in supplementary 
appendix A for predicted probabilities). Again, FPOs are, 
in general, more likely to secure ‘adequate’ quality scores, 
but less likely to be in the ‘high-quality’ category, relative 
to PSOs and TSOs. For example, the predicted proba-
bility for FPOs to be in the ‘high-quality’ category in the 
care and support domain is 58.4%, whereas it is 69.2% for 
PSOs and 66.8% for TSOs. The predicted probability for 
FPOs to be of ‘adequate quality’ in the same domain is 
40.1% versus 30.3% for PSOs and 32.2% for TSOs.
In table 5, we see that the differences in predicted 
probabilities for ‘adequate’ and ‘high’ quality are 
Table 4 Cross tabulation of sector over quality domains, risk score and requirements/complaints posed after inspection 
within last 3 years
For-profit sector Public sector Third sector
Quality of care (n=12 322)
  Poor quality 57 (0.78) 10 (0.39) 20 (0.80)
  Adequate quality 2641 (36.31) 732 (28.73) 718 (28.71)
  Good quality 4575 (62.90) 1806 (70.88) 1763 (70.49)
Quality of staff (n=7933)
  Poor quality 59 (2.04) 8 (0.31) 25 (1.00)
  Adequate quality 1475 (51.09) 783 (30.74) 875 (35.01)
  Good quality 1353 (46.87) 1756 (68.94) 1599 (63.99)
Quality of environment (n=10 293)
  Poor quality 32 (0.48) 7 (0.32) 11 (0.81)
  Adequate quality 2515 (37.58) 759 (35.60) 553 (40.84)
  Good quality 4145 (61.94) 1408 (64.77) 790 (58.35)
Quality of management (n=12 386)
  Poor quality 107 (1.47) 15 (0.59) 38 (1.52)
  Adequate quality 3642 (50.12) 1041 (40.87) 1033 (41.83)
  Good quality 3518 (48.41) 1491 (58.54) 1441 (56.65)
Risk of services (n=13 268)
  Low risk 7263 (89.96) 2420 (93.22) 2259 (86.95)
  Medium risk 504 (6.24) 140 (5.39) 231 (8.89)
  High risk 307 (3.8) 36 (1.39) 108 (4.16)
Complaints received within last 3 years
  No 7233 (89.16) 2453 (94.46) 2377 (91.35)
  Yes 879 (10.84) 144 (5.54) 225 (8.65)
  Total 8112 2597 2602
Requirements posed after inspection within last 3 years
  No 4944 (81.69) 2025 (86.72) 1737 (80.57)
  Yes 1108 (18.31) 310 (13.28) 419 (19.43)
  Total 6052 2335 2156
Percentages in parentheses. 
 o
n




pen: first published as 10.1136/bmjopen-2018-022975 on 15 February 2019. Downloaded from 
6 Bach-Mortensen AM, Montgomery P. BMJ Open 2019;9:e022975. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2018-022975
Open access 
mostly statistically significant for public and third sector 
providers, compared with FPOs. The only quality domain 
which did not display this pattern was ‘quality of environ-
ment’, in which the differences in predicted probabilities 
between FPOs and TSOs were not statistically significant. 
Further, FPOs were more likely to given a ‘poor quality’ 
rating compared with PSOs for ‘quality of care’, ‘quality 
of staff’ and ‘quality of management’, although the abso-
lute differences are relatively small (below 2 percentage 
points). There were no statistically significant differences 
in the ‘poor quality’ rating between TSOs and FPOs.
Differences between public and third sector providers
We observe several significant differences in the probabil-
ities between PSOs and TSOs, although the differences 
in probability are smaller compared with the for-profit 
sector. For ‘quality of staff’, ‘quality of environment’ and 
‘quality of management’, PSOs were more likely to be in 
the high-quality category compared with TSOs (66.4% 
vs 60.5%, 62.5% vs 54.8%, and 56.2% vs 53.7%, respec-
tively). Similarly, TSOs were more likely to be rated of 
‘adequate quality’ in ‘quality of staff’ (38.3%) and ‘quality 
of environment’ (44.2%) relative to PSOs (33.72% and 
37%, respectively). For ‘quality of care’, ‘quality of staff’ 
and ‘quality of management’, TSOs are slightly, but statis-
tically significantly, more likely to be in the low-quality 
group relative to PSOs (difference below 1.5 percentage 
points).
risk of services
For-profit providers were the least likely to be classified 
as ‘low-risk’ services (79.9%), and the most likely to be 
in ‘medium-risk’ (13.2%) and ‘high-risk’ (6.9%) groups. 
PSOs had the highest probability of being categorised 
as ‘low-risk’ services (91.1%), and the lowest probability 
of having their services classified as of ‘medium’ (6.9%) 
and ‘high risk’ (2%), followed by TSOs (86%, 8.5%, and 
4.5%, respectively). Most differences across the levels 
of risk between sectors were statistically significant, but 
the differences between PSO and TSOs were substan-
tially smaller compared with TSOs versus FPOs and PSOs 
versus FPOs.
Complaints and requirements
Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities for organ-
isations to have been subject to a complaint or 
requirement in the last 3 years across sector. Again, 
we observe that FPOs are significantly more likely to 
having been issued at least one complaint, compared 
with PSOs and TSOs, with a difference of 17.1 and 
14 percentage points, respectively (see table 6). Simi-
larly, FPOs were more likely to having been subject 
to a requirement after inspection, relative to PSOs 
and TSOs with a difference of 10.5 percentage points 
for PSOs and FPOs, and 5.6 percentage points for 
TSOs and FPOs. PSOs were significantly more likely 
to having received a requirement or complaint rela-
tive to TSOs, but the differences were substantially 
smaller compared with FPOs.
Other explanatory factors
The number of years an organisation has been regis-
tered with the Care Inspectorate and the number 
of employed staff were both significant predictors 
of quality. The association between age and quality 
showed that the older the organisation, the higher 
Figure 1 Predicted probabilities for the four quality domains, risk, complaints and requirements across sectors with 95% 
CIs. All quality outcomes are based on a scale of low, adequate and high quality. The risk outcome is based on a scale of low, 
medium and high risk. The complaint and requirement outcomes are binary with the predicted probabilities referring to the 
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probability of being rated of high quality. Further, the 
more paid staff an organisation had, the more likely 
an organisation was to be in the ‘adequate’ category, 
whereas the probability of being in the ‘high-quality’ 
category decreased with the number of employed 
staff. Neither the effects of staff and time in operation 
on quality were interacted by sector.
subanalyses
We reran the analyses on the biggest subgroups of services 
(ie, care homes, support services, child care services and 
housing support services), which can be found in in table 
A5 in the online supplementary appendix A and figures 
B1–B5 in the online supplementary appendix C. Most 
of these subanalyses resulted in slightly reduced effects 
Table 5 This table displays the difference in predicted probabilities across sectors over the quality and risk domains with 
95% CIs
Low quality Adequate quality High quality
Quality of care and support (n=7011)
  Public versus for-profit sector −0.011*** −0.098*** 0.108***
  95% CI −0.018 to −0.004 −0.135 to −0.061 0.071 to 0.146
  Third versus for-profit sector −0.005 −0.079*** 0.084***
  95% CI −0.014 to 0.003 −0.116 to −0.042 0.047 to 0.121
  Third versus public sector 0.006 0.019 −0.024
  95% CI −0.001 to 0.012 −0.015 to 0.053 0.010 to 0.261
Quality of staff (n=7007)
  Public versus for-profit sector −0.013*** −0.125*** 0.138***
  95% CI −0.020 to −0.006 −0.164 to −0.087 0.100 to 0.177
  Third versus for-profit sector −0.005 −0.074*** 0.079***
  95% CI −0.014 to 0.004 −0.112 to −0.036 0.041 to 0.117
  Third versus public sector 0.008* 0.051* −0.059***
  95% CI 0.002 to 0.015 0.015 to 0.086 −0.095 to −0.023
Quality of environment (n=5099)
  Public versus for-profit sector −0.003 −0.106*** 0.110***
  95% CI −0.010 to 0.004 −0.151 to −0.061 0.065 to 0.154
  Third versus for-profit sector 0.001 −0.034 0.033
  95% CI 0.004 to 0.010 −0.082 to 0.015 0.015 to 0.081
  Third versus public sector 0.004 0.073*** −0.077***
  95% CI −0.004 to 0.012 0.030 to 0.115 −0.119 to −0.034
Quality of management (n=7004)
  Public versus for-profit sector −0.019*** −0.093*** 0.112***
  95% CI −0.028 to −0.010 −0.133 to −0.133 0.073 to 0.152
  Third versus for-profit sector −0.007 −0.070*** 0.077***
  95% CI −0.018 to 0.004 −0.109 to −0.031 0.039 to 0.116
  Third versus public sector 0.012*** 0.023 −0.035
  95% CI 0.004 to 0.020 −0.014 to 0.060 −0.072 to 0.002
Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk
Risk of services (n=7335)
  Public versus for-profit sector 0.112*** −0.063*** −0.049*** 
  95% CI 0.086 to 0.138 0.086 to −0.040 −0.064 to −0.034 
  Third versus for-profit sector 0.071*** −0.047*** −0.024* 
  95% CI 0.045 to 0.098 −0.071 to −0.024 −0.041 to −0.007 
  Third versus public sector −0.041*** 0.016 0.025***
  95% CI −0.063 to −0.018 −0.004 to 0.036 0.012 to 0.038 
*p<0.05; ***p<0.001. Also, higher values of risk indicate higher risk of services.
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of sector and with less clear differences between PSOs 
and TSOs. However, both the raw cross tabulations and 
the predicted probabilities generally display the same 
substantive pattern and direction of effects with FPOs 
being more likely to be classified as of adequate quality 
and of higher risk relative to TSOs and PSOs, which are 
more likely to be rated as high quality and of lower risk.
DIsCussIOn
The present study finds that public and third sector 
providers are more likely to be rated of high quality and 
of lower risk compared with FPOs, which are more likely 
to be rated of adequate quality and of higher risk. This 
pattern was similarly observed in FPOs being more likely 
to receive requirements and complaints compared with 
their public and third sector counterparts.
The results can be thought to correspond with the 
notion that TSOs and PSOs are primarily driven by 
pro-social values and will thus be more motivated to maxi-
mise quality of services. Conversely, it may be contended 
that rational FPOs, being primarily motivated by profits, 
will coordinate their resources so that services fall within 
adequate standards. While PSOs were often less likely to 
be rated of ‘low quality’ relative to TSOs and FPOs, sector 
was generally not a strong predictor of the likelihood of 
organisations being given ‘low quality’ rating, which may 
be understood as all sectors being similarly incentivised 
not to be rated below acceptable threshold.
These findings echo a recent study on the quality of 
nursing homes, which utilised data from the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) in England and Wales to test whether 
quality ratings varied according to sector finding that 
third and public providers were significantly more likely 
be rated of higher quality than FPOs, as measured by the 
quality index of the CQC.39 However, contrary to our 
findings, the paper did not identify any statistically signif-
icant differences between third and public sector nursing 
homes.
strengths and limitations
This study adds to the existing research in several ways. 
First, the present study replicated results of past research 
in a new context controlling for more factors (eg, number 
of staff) and on a larger range of outcomes (eg, user-re-
ported complaints) than in prior research. Second, the 
effect of sector on quality were robust to subsequent 
subanalyses and may thus be thought to generalise across 
the included types of care services in the Scottish context. 
Further, contrary to existing research, the study identified 
several significant differences between PSOs and TSOs, 
which often favoured the performance of PSOs. Yet, these 
differences in quality were substantially smaller compared 
with for-profit versus public and third sector providers.
This study is subject to several limitations, some of 
which are due to the nature of the data. For example, the 
lack of effect of sector on quality for levels of low quality 
(1–2) may be driven by the low number of observations 
in these categories. However, that origin of sector had 
no effect on quality is consistent to the idea that organ-
isations from different sectors will, theoretically, have a 
similar disincentive to be rated as inadequate.
A more substantial limitation of the analysis is that 
service types may differ systematically across sectors. For 
example, it may be that clients served by FPOs are inher-
ently different from those served by third and public 
sector providers. To address this issue, we controlled for 
all organisational characteristics allowed for by the data 
(eg, service types, years of registration and number of 
employees) and ran the models separately on all major 
service types, showing the same substantive pattern as 
reported in the main results. Although all models adjusted 
for the types of clients served by the social care providers 
(eg, children, older people, dementia patients), the data 
collected by the Care Inspectorate do not include individ-
ual-level information on clients served, and we could thus 
not investigate client variation in terms of, for example, 
socioeconomic status across sectors. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no existing research investigating 
client variation across sectors for social care services,3 39 40 
which is important to explore in future research.
The analysis is built on the assumption that the quality 
ratings by the Care Inspectorate can be considered reli-
able indicators for the latent construct of ‘quality’, which 
may be a flawed assumption. Yet, the observed effects 
were consistent across different quality domains, which 
suggest that the effects of sector were—at least—robust 
to the construct of quality employed by the Care Inspec-
torate. Also, the pattern observed for the quality and risk 
domains was consistent with the inspection requirements 
and complaints outcomes.
Last, the results should be interpreted in the light of the 
context of the data. The analysis was conducted on Scot-
tish data on certain types of care services and the findings 
therefore primarily apply to that context. To test whether the 
observed effects do indeed transfer to other countries and 
service settings (eg, healthcare), further research must repli-
cate these analyses using comparable outcomes.
Table 6 This table displays differences in predicted 
probabilities to have been issued a complaint or requirement 
in the last 3 years across sector
95% CIs
If a complaint has been issued within last 3 years (n=7358)
  Public versus for-profit sector 0.171*** 0.197 to 0.144
  Third versus for-profit sector 0.140*** 0.167 to 0.112
  Third versus public sector −0.031*** −0.012 to −0.050
If a requirement has been issued after inspection within last 
3 years (n=6320)
  Public versus for-profit sector 0.105*** 0.138 to 0.072
  Third versus for-profit sector 0.056*** 0.138 to 0.072
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Implications for policy and practice
Research on the typology of sector tend to be based on 
theory with limited attention on what the features distinct 
to each sector mean in practice and whether they influ-
ence aspects such as service delivery. Importantly, the find-
ings of this paper do not indicate that services by FPOs 
are poor; in fact, the findings demonstrate that origin of 
sector was, for the most part, not a strong predictor of 
whether care organisations performed below acceptable 
standards. Also, similar to past research, the findings do 
not imply a causal effect of sector due to the observational 
nature of the data.41 However, the findings can be inter-
preted to imply that care organisations driven by pro-so-
cial motivations tend to perform better than those that 
are not, although this remains a theoretical interpreta-
tion, as the analysis does not include a concrete measure 
of motive. Going forward, it is essential to explore mech-
anisms to investigate whether the association found in 
this analysis is spurious or indeed the result of some 
sector-specific traits.
COnClusIOn
This paper investigated if origin of sector influence the 
quality of social care services regulated by the Care Inspec-
torate in Scotland to find that providers from the third 
and public sectors were rated of higher quality and lower 
risk than for-profit providers. Importantly, the analysis 
does not provide any empirical answer to why differences 
across sectors are observed. Although the results are 
consistent with theory and past research, more research 
is needed to explore what exact characteristics account 
for the variation in quality observed across sectors. From 
the findings, it follows that regulators and policymakers 
should incorporate more thought on how organisations 
across different sectors are incentivised to manage their 
resources, as this might influence the subsequent perfor-
mance of commissioned services. However, there is little 
research addressing how this is best realised in practice, 
which warrant further analysis. 
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